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Abstract:  
Monetary policy is sometimes formulated in terms of a target level of inflation, a fixed time 
horizon and a constant interest rate that is anticipated to achieve the target at the specified 
horizon. These requirements lead to constant interest rate (CIR)instrument rules. Using the 
standard New Keynesian model, it is shown that some forms of CIR policy lead to both 
indeterminacy of equilibria and instability under adaptive learning. However, some other 
forms of CIR policy perform better. We also examine the properties of the different policy 
rules in the presence of inertial demand and price behaviour. 
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inflation inertia 1 Introduction
Inﬂation targeting has become a fairly common objective of monetary policy
in the past ten to ﬁfteen years; see e.g. (Svensson 2003a). This general
objective can be implemented in a number of diﬀerent ways. One possibility
is to formulate an explicit objective function, i.e. a “general targeting rule”
using the terminology suggested by Lars Svensson. A diﬀerent approach has
been the use of a particular target level for the inﬂation rate. This target is
usually speciﬁed at some given horizon for the future and we may speak of
inﬂation forecast targeting in this case. Formally, the inﬂation target is set
for some ﬁxed forecast horizon h and policy tries to achieve that target:
Etπt+h =¯ π. (1)
Here Etπt+h is the forecast of the inﬂation for period t+h and in the analysis
it will be taken to be the rational expectations (RE) forecast as the central
bank is, for simplicity, assumed to know the structural model of the economy.
It can be noted that, if the horizon is long, there will typically be many
diﬀerent paths for interest rates up to the target horizon that achieve the
speciﬁed inﬂation target. If this is the case, a ﬁxed inﬂation target at the
speciﬁed horizon does not yield a unique value or time path for the interest
rate, which is the actual instrument of monetary policy. A further special-
ization for achieving the ﬁxed target is to use inﬂation forecasts that are
derived as constant interest rate (CIR) projections, see e.g. the discussions
in (Leitemo 2003) and (Svensson 1999). CIR inﬂation targeting has been
advocated as an easily understandable and hence practical approach to con-
ducting monetary policy; for general discussions of its merits and problems
see (Goodhart 2000), (Kohn 2000), (Svensson 2003b) and (Woodford 2003),
pp. 620-623.
In practice there appear to be at least two diﬀerent ways for computing
and employing the CIR projections in setting the value for the monetary
policy instrument. One approach, which is arguably close to the practice
in the UK, has been described by (Goodhart 2000), p.177: ”When I was a
member of the MPC I thought that I was trying, at each forecast round,
to set the level of interest rates so that, without the need for future rate
changes, prospective (forecast) inﬂation would on average equal the target
at the policy”.1 Given a model of the macroeconomy, setting the forecast of
1Charles Goodhart has commented to us as a qualiﬁcation that this practice is not to
2inﬂation based on constant interest rates at a given target level of inﬂation
implies a rule for the interest rate.
A second approach to CIR policy-making is in general terms described
by the quote “... if the overall picture of inﬂation prospects (based on an
unchanged repo rate) indicates that in twelve to twenty-four months’ time
inﬂation will deviate from the target, then the repo rate should normally
be adjusted accordingly”; see (Riksbanken 1999). This way of conducting
monetary policy seems (at least implicitly) to be the practice in Sweden.2 In
this approach the CIR projection is computed at the interest rate prevailing
before any policy decision and the rate of interest is then adjusted depending
on the diﬀerence between the CIR projection and the inﬂation target.
We will refer to these two ways of conducting monetary policy in general
as CIR inﬂation targeting and corresponding interest rate rules as CIR rules.
In addition, we will refer to the two approaches as CIRUK and CIRS policies
respectively.
CIRinﬂation targeting necessarily introduces a further element of forward-
looking behavior into the economy in addition to the forward-looking be-
havior of private agents that is assumed in many current models for mon-
etary policy. If the model has forward-looking elements, issues of deter-
minacy of rational expectations equilibria (REE) and their stability under
(adaptive) learning have been raised in the recent literature. (Bullard and
Mitra 2002) have derived constraints on the interest rate instrument (or Tay-
lor) rules that achieve stability and determinacy in a standard New Keyne-
sian model of monetary policy. (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) and (Evans
and Honkapohja 2003c) have shown that some standard ways for implement-
ing optimal policy under discretion or commitment can lead to the diﬃ-
culties of indeterminacy and instability under learning. They also propose
expectations-based optimal rules to overcome these problems. (Evans and
Honkapohja 2003a) survey this literature and provide further references.
Our principal goal in this paper is to analyze CIR policies from the point
of view of determinacy and stability under learning. We will study both
CIRUK and CIRS policies in these respects. We will argue that CIRUK
policies can very often lead to unpleasant outcomes, i.e. the resulting REE
can exhibit both indeterminacy and instability under learning. CIRS policies
be followed if it leads to drastic policy changes. Our second interpretation of CIR policy
has a more gradualist approach to changing interest rates.
2Anders Vredin pointed to us that in practice policy appears to respond to other aspects
of the economy besides CIR forecasts of inﬂation.
3policies perform better with regard to both determinacy and stability under
learning, but they are not always problem-free either. We also examine the
(more realistic) policy of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting and the consequences of
inherent inertia in inﬂation and output for the indeterminacy and instability
results.
2 The Framework
2.1 The Basic Model
The model we employ is the standard New Keynesian model of monopolistic
competition and (Calvo 1983) price stickiness. This model has been employed
in numerous recent studies of monetary policy; see e.g. (Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler 1999) for a survey. The log-linearized model is described by two
equations
xt = −ϕ(it − E
∗
tπt+1)+E
∗
txt+1 + gt, (2)
which is the “IS” curve derived from the Euler equation for consumer opti-
mization, and
πt = λxt + βE
∗
tπt+1 + ut, (3)
which is the price setting rule for the monopolistically competitive ﬁrms.3
We remark that in a later section we will add inertia terms to (2) and (3).
The inertia is usually justiﬁed by empirical relevance even though the micro
foundations of the model are then fairly weak.4
Here xt and πt denote the output gap and inﬂation for period t, respec-
tively. it is the nominal interest rate, expressed as the deviation from the
steady state real interest rate. The determination of it will be discussed be-
low. E∗
txt+1 and E∗
tπt+1 denote the private sector expectations of the output
gap and inﬂation next period. Since our focus is on learning behavior, these
expectations need not be rational (Et without ∗ denotes RE). The parameters
ϕ and λ are positive and β is the discount factor so that 0 <β<1.
The shocks gt and ut are assumed to be observable and follow
 
gt
ut
 
= V
 
gt−1
ut−1
 
+
 
˜ gt
˜ ut
 
, (4)
3See e.g. (Woodford 1996) or (Woodford 2003) for further details of the linearization
and the original nonlinear model.
4See (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2001) and (Gali and Gertler 1999) for possible
justiﬁcations.
4where
V =
 
µ 0
0 ρ
 
,
0 < |µ| < 1, 0 < |ρ| < 1 and ˜ gt ∼ iid(0,σ2
g), ˜ ut ∼ iid(0,σ 2
u) are independent
white noise. gt represents shocks to government purchases and or potential
output. ut represents any cost push shocks to marginal costs other than those
entering through xt. For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that µ
and ρ are known (if not, they could be estimated).
For brevity, details of the derivation of equations (2) and (3) are not dis-
cussed. The derivation is based on individual Euler equations under (identi-
cal) subjective expectations, together with aggregation and deﬁnitions of the
variables. The Euler equations for the current period give the decisions as
functions of the expected state next period. Rules for forecasting the next
period’s values of the state variables are the other ingredient in the descrip-
tion of individual behavior. Given forecasts, agents are assumed to make
decisions according to the Euler equations.5
For further analysis we write the model in matrix-vector form
yt = AE
∗
tyt+1 + Bwt + Dit, (5)
wt = Vw t−1 + vt,
where yt =( xt,π t) , wt =( gt,u t)  and vt =( ˜ gt, ˜ ut) . E∗
tyt+1 denotes private
expectations of yt. The coeﬃcient matrices are
A =
 
1 ϕ
λβ + λϕ
 
,B=
 
10
λ 1
 
,D=
 
−ϕ
−λϕ
 
. (6)
In the next two subsections we introduce the formalization of CIRUK and
CIRS policies. In this and the next section, we consider the case when the
central bank tries to hit a certain inﬂation target at a speciﬁed horizon. Such
a policy is often termed one of strict inﬂation targeting, al a(Svensson 1999)
and (Svensson 2003a). Even though this policy is not entirely realistic from
a practical point of view since most central banks have output concerns
(either implicitly or explicitly), it does serve as a useful benchmark. The case
5This kind of behavior is boundedly rational but in our view reasonable since agents
attempt to meet the margin of optimality between the current and the next period. Other
models of bounded rationality are possible. Recently, (Preston 2002) has proposed a
formulation in which long horizons matter in individual behavior. See also (Honkapohja,
Mitra, and Evans 2002) for further discussion.
5when the bank pursues a policy of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting is considered in
Section 4.1.
2.2 CIRUK Policy
We ﬁrst consider CIRUK formulation of CIR policy. This has been recently
formalized by (Leitemo 2003), which can be consulted for further details.
We introduce the (strict) inﬂation target as in (1), where for simplicity the
target ¯ π is assumed to be zero without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) and h is
the targeting horizon.6 We note that in the derivation of CIR policies it is
assumed that expectations are rational. For later purposes it will be useful
to express this constraint as
0=K(Etwt+h,E tyt+h)
 , K =( 0 ,0,0,1). (7)
To derive the interest rate rule, rewrite (5) as
 
wt+1
Etyt+1
 
=Ω
 
wt
yt
 
+Ψ it +
 
vt
0
 
, (8)
where
Ω=
 
V 0
−A−1BA −1
 
≡




µ 00 0
0 ρ 00
−1 ϕβ
−1 1+λϕβ
−1 −ϕβ
−1
0 −β
−1 −λβ
−1 β
−1



,
Ψ=
 
0
−A−1D
 
≡ ( 00ϕ 0 )
 .
Iterate (8) forward to get
 
Etwt+h
Etyt+h
 
=Ω
h
 
wt
yt
 
+
h−1  
j=0
Ω
jΨEtit+h−1−j, (9)
Pre-multiplying (9) by K yields
Etπt+h = KΩ
h
 
wt
yt
 
+ K
h−1  
j=0
Ω
jΨEtit+h−1−j. (10)
6This is without loss of generality as the precise values of model constants aﬀect neither
determinacy nor stability under learning.
6CIRUK targeting policy central bank assumes that
Etit+j = it for 0 ≤ j ≤ h − 1, (11)
where in (11) it is assumed that expected future interest rates are equal to
the contemporaneous interest rate it for all horizons 0 ≤ j ≤ h − 1. In other
words, in the formulation of policy, the bank assumes a constant path of
interest rates at the current level. Using assumption (11) in (10) leads to
Etπt+h(it)=KΩ
h
 
wt
yt
 
+ K
h−1  
j=0
Ω
jΨit (12)
where Etπt+h(it) denotes the constant-interest-rate forecast of inﬂation con-
ditional on the forward-looking variables xt,πt and the contemporaneous
interest rate it. Finally, setting Etπt+h(it) in (12) equal to the (target) zero
yields the interest rate rule
it = G
 
wt
yt
 
, G = −
 
K
h−1  
j=0
Ω
jΨ
 −1
KΩ
h. (13)
W ew i l lr e f e rt o( 1 3 )a st h eCIRUK rule I.
The CIRUK rule I, equation (13), has the general form
it = χggt + χuut + χxxt + χππt. (14)
(14) is thus an instrument rule like the classic rule studied by (Taylor 1993)
and it can be explicitly computed for diﬀerent values of h.F o rh =2we get
χg = ϕ
−1,χ u = −
1+βρ+ λϕ
βλϕ
,χ x = −
1+β + λϕ
βϕ
,χ π =
1+λϕ
βλϕ
.
It is seen that, for h =2 , the rule (13) surprisingly has χx < 0, i.e. the
interest rate should react negatively to the output gap. For higher values
of h the expressions χi,i = g,u,x,π become cumbersome, but numerical
computations indicate that the negative coeﬃcient on the output gap is a
robust phenomenon of the CIRUK rule I.
This unexpected result can be given an economic interpretation in the
case h =2 . To understand this result, it will be helpful to ignore the shocks.
7Shift the New Phillips curve (3) forward and take RE. Recalling that the
inﬂation target is assumed to be zero, we have
Etπt+1 = λEtxt+1,
which pins down the expectations terms in (2) and yields the positive relation
between Etπt+1 and Etxt+1.B y( 3 )w ea l s oh a v e
Etπt+1 = β
−1(πt − λxt),
which indicates that both Etπt+1 and Etxt+1 depend negatively on the current
output gap under this policy. Finally, rewriting the IS curve (2), ignoring
shocks, as
ϕit = −xt + ϕEtπt+1 + Etxt+1
= −(1 + β
−1 + β
−1λϕ)xt +( β
−1ϕ + β
−1λ
−1)πt
it is seen that it and xt are negatively related, both directly as part of the IS
relationship and indirectly through the negative dependence of Etπt+1 and
Etxt+1 on the current xt.
We remark that (13) should be viewed as an instrument rule as, in addi-
tion to the observable exogenous shocks, it depends on current endogenous
variables. It is an instrument rule like the widely discussed rule due to
(Taylor 1993). (13) can be viewed as a behavioral rule in the same sense as
demand and supply functions of private agents are behavioral rules, i.e. the
central bank “goes to the market” with that schedule and is able to adjust
the interest rate within the period.7 Such rules are sometimes said to be
non-operational; see (McCallum 1999) for further discussion.
For this reason a diﬀerent rule, which depends only on predetermined
variables is often suggested instead. It can be derived as follows. Substituting
(13) into (8) we have
 
wt+1
Etyt+1
 
=( Ω+Ψ G)
 
wt
yt
 
+
 
vt
0
 
,
for which it is possible to derive the MSV solution of the form
yt = Hwt (15)
7Alternatively, this kind of rule is referred to as an equilibrium condition; see e.g.
(Leitemo 2003). The terms “implicit and explicit reaction functions” are also used.
8using standard techniques (we omit the precise form of H). (The MSV
solutions are REE that are usually employed in the applied literature.) In-
troducing the partition G =
 
Gw Gy
 
, we can rewrite the interest rule
(13) as
it =( Gw + GyH)wt, (16)
which we will call the CIRUK rule II.
2.3 CIRS Policy
As mentioned in the Introduction, an alternative interest rule, which we call
a CIRS rule, is based on computing CIR forecasts of inﬂation at the interest
rate before any policy decision and then changing the interest rate if the
forecast deviates from the target. Formally, the policy-maker ﬁrst makes a
forecast of inﬂation, conditioned on a constant interest rate level at the level
of it−1 from period t − 1. This forecast is compared with the target rate. If
the forecast is above the target, the interest rate is raised.
One simple rule that reﬂects this way of thinking is8
it − it−1 = ω(Etπt+h(it−1) − ¯ π), (17)
where Etπt+h(it−1) denotes the inﬂation forecast conditioned on the last pe-
riod interest rate, i.e., the bank assumes
Etit+j = it−1, for all 0 ≤ j ≤ h − 1
instead of (11). We again assume ¯ π =0 , w.l.o.g. ω>0 determines the
magnitude of the extent of increase in it when the inﬂation forecast is above
target. From (10) we now have
Etπt+h(it−1)=KΩ
h
 
wt
yt
 
+ K
h−1  
j=0
Ω
jΨit−1 (18)
Written explicitly, (18) takes the form
Etπt+h(it−1)=ψggt + ψuut + ψxxt + ψππt + ψiit−1 (19)
8This is a simpliﬁed version of a rule proposed by Anders Vredin in the discussion at
the CFS conference.
9where the coeﬃcients ψg,ψu,ψ x,ψ π,ψi can be computed for diﬀerent values
of h. For example, when h =2 , t h e s et a k et h ev a l u e s
ψg = λβ
−1,ψ u = −β
−2(1 + βρ+ λϕ),ψ x = −λβ
−2(1 + β + λϕ),
ψπ = β
−2(1 + λϕ),ψi = −λϕβ
−1.
Using (19) in (17), we obtain CIRS rule I of the form
it = ω(ψggt + ψuut + ψxxt + ψππt)+( 1+ωψi)it−1 (20)
Note that the CIRS rule I, (20), captures a form of interest smoothing fre-
quently observed in the data.
As before, we can also deﬁne an interest rule which depends solely on pre-
determined variables using the MSV solution of the model when CIRS rule I
is employed. We now consider the formulation of the CIRS rule II associated
with (17). Since the use of CIRS rule I in (20) introduces the lagged interest
rate as a predetermined endogenous variable, the MSV solution of the model
(5) with CIRS rule I, (20), takes the form
xt = bxit−1 + b
g
xgt + b
u
xut, (21)
πt = bπit−1 + b
g
πgt + b
u
πut, (22)
it = biit−1 + b
g
igt + b
u
i ut, (23)
where the coeﬃcients bx,... need to be determined. Furthermore, for a de-
terminate MSV solution, we have |bi| < 1, and using this solution in CIRS
rule I, (20), we may obtain uniquely CIRS rule II below9
it = b
 
iit−1 + ˜ ψggt + ˜ ψuut. (24)
Here b 
i = ωψxbx+ωψπbπ +(1+ωψi) and ˜ ψg, ˜ ψu describe the dependence on
the shocks (their precise form is not needed in the computations).
2.4 Calibration Scenarios
In several places we will need to revert to numerical results in the study the
properties of CIR policies introduced above. For our numerical analysis, we
will frequently adopt three calibration scenarios proposed in the literature.
9In cases when the model has indeterminacy and hence potentially multiple stationary
MSV solutions with CIRS rule I, there is no unique way to deﬁne CIRS rule II.
10Calibration W: β =0 .99,ϕ=( 0 .157)−1, and λ =0 .024.
Calibration CGG: β =0 .99,ϕ=1 , and λ =0 .3.
Calibration MN: β =0 .99,ϕ=0 .164, and λ =0 .3.
These are taken, respectively, from (Woodford 1999), (Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler 2000), and (McCallum and Nelson 1999). For an analysis of E-
stability, we sometimes need the values of ρ and µ and we set these at ρ =0 .9
and µ =0 .35 in accordance with the literature.
3 Determinacy and Learning Stability
3.1 Results for CIRUK Policies, Types I and II
We consider whether CIRUK interest rate rules, either in the form (13) or
(16), yield determinacy and stability under learning of the MSV REE. We
will assess stability under learning using the concept of E-stability, which
is known to be the relevant condition for convergence of adaptive learning
formulated using least squares and closely related learning rules. Formal
analysis of determinacy is standard; see e.g. (Blanchard and Kahn 1980) or
Chapter 10 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). For an analysis of E-stability
in models like this, we refer the reader to (Bullard and Mitra 2002) for an
overview and to (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) for a detailed discussion. The
analysis is conducted using the forward-looking model (2) and (3), together
with either (13) or (16).
It is convenient to start with CIRUK rule II (16). Plugging this rule into
the model (5) leads to the reduced form
yt = AE
∗
tyt+1 + {B + D(Gw + GyH)}wt. (25)
In the basic model it has unpleasant properties on both counts:10
Proposition 1 CIRUK rule II, i.e. equation (16), leads to both indetermi-
nacy and instability under adaptive learning.
10The result follows directly from Proposition 2 in (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) sta-
ting that, in the New Keynesian model, any interest rate rule that depends only on the
exogenous shocks lead to both indeterminacy and instability under learning.
11The indeterminacy result means that there other stationary REE to the
model under the CIRUK rule II besides the MSV solution used above. These
equilibria include various sunspot solutions and it is possible to examine
whether the non-MSV solutions are stable under learning. Using results of
(Honkapohja and Mitra 2001), it can be shown that the non-MSV REE are
also E-unstable. Thus there are no E-stable REE under CIRUK rule II.
The diﬃculties spelled out by Proposition 1 naturally raise the question
whether the instrument rule form of CIR monetary policy, i.e. CIRUK rule
I given by equation (13) has better determinacy or learnability properties.
Unfortunately, this is not the case:
Proposition 2 CIRUK rule I leads to both indeterminacy and E-instability
in model (2)-(3) when h ≥ 3.F o r h =2the model has indeterminacy but
the unique MSV solution is E-stable.
In Appendix A we prove the result for values h ≤ 4. For higher values
of h we have computed the relevant conditions numerically using the three
baseline calibrations. The results clearly indicate that the CIRUK rule I
delivers neither determinacy nor stability under learning.
3.2 Results for CIRS Policies, Types I and II
We now turn to an analysis of the performance of CIRS type policy. To
analyze determinacy, we plug the rule (20) into the basic model (5) and
obtain the following system after deﬁning zt =( xt,π t,i t−1) 
B1Etzt+1 = B2zt + shocks, (26)
where
B1 =


1 ϕ 0
λβ + λϕ 0
001

,B 2 =


1+ϕωψx ϕωψπ ϕ(1 + ωψi)
λϕωψx 1+λϕωψπ λϕ(1 + ωψi)
ωψx ωψπ 1+ωψi


The matrix for computing determinacy is then given by B3 ≡ B
−1
1 B2, which
explicitly is
B3 =


1+β
−1λϕ + ϕωψx β
−1ϕ(βωψπ − 1) ϕ(1 + ωψi)
−β
−1λβ
−1 0
ωψx ωψπ 1+ωψi


12Since xt,π t are free while it−1 is pre-determined, REE is determinate if and
only if exactly one eigenvalue of B3 is inside the unit circle.
When h =2 , we can obtain a partial result on determinacy. The following
proposition is proved in Appendix B:
Proposition 3 Let h =2and 0 <ω<1. The necessary and suﬃcient
condition for determinacy is that the expression E given below be positive,
where
E ≡ (1−ω)ωλ
2ϕ
2(2+λϕ)+ωβλϕ{4+(3−ω)λϕ}+β
2{(3ω−1)λϕ−2}−2β
3
If the expression above is negative, we have indeterminacy. In general,
determinacy depends on the structural parameters. For the three baseline
calibrations, it is easily checked that the expression above is positive when
0 <ω<1 so that determinacy always obtains. For higher horizons, the
characteristic polynomial for B3 becomes quite cumbersome so that we will
examine determinacy numerically below without employing Proposition 3.
To analyze E-stability, we need to put the system in the following form
ςt =   ˆ Etςt+1 + δςt−1 + κwt, (27)
  =  


1 ϕ(1 − ωβψπ)0
λβ + λϕ + βϕωψπ 0
ω(λψπ + ψx) ω{(β + λϕ)ψπ + ϕψx} 0

,
δ =  


00 −ϕ(1 + ωψi)
00−λϕ(1 + ωψi)
00 1 + ωψi

, 
−1 =1+ϕω(λψπ + ψx).
where ςt =( xt,πt,i t)  and ψx,ψπ,ψi are the coeﬃcients in (19).
The MSV solution of the model (27) takes the form
ςt =¯ a +¯ bςt−1 +¯ cwt (28)
with ¯ a =0and ¯ b to be determined from ¯ b =( I −  ¯ b)−1δ, provided the
relevant inverse exists.11 In the determinate case, there is only one solution
of ¯ b with eigenvalues inside the unit circle; in the indeterminate case there
may exist more than one.
For the analysis of learning, agents have a PLM of the form
ςt = a + bςt−1 + cwt,
from which one can compute expectations12 as ˆ Etςt+1 =( I + b)a + b2ςt−1 +
11Obviously, ¯ b has only zeros in the ﬁrst two columns.
12We assume that the time t information set does not include ςt.
13(bc + cV )wt and inserting ˆ Etςt+1 into the model gives the ALM
ςt =(   +  b)a +(  b
2 + b)ςt−1 +(  bc +  cV + κ)wt
When the time t information set is (1,ς 
t−1,w t) , the E-stability conditions
for an MSV solution require us to have the eigenvalues of the matrices ¯ b  ⊗
 +I ⊗ ¯ b−I, V ⊗ +I ⊗ ¯ b−I,  + ¯ b−I, to have negative real parts;
see Chapter 10 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) for details. Otherwise, the
solution is not E-stable.
We now look numerically at E-stability of the determinate MSV solution
for diﬀerent horizons h, ranging from 2 to 8.T a b l e1b e l o wr e p o r t sap a i ro f
critical values of ω, (ˇ ω,ˆ ω) such that for all 0 <ω≤ ˇ ω, one has determinacy
with the determinate MSV solution being E-stable. For values of ω such
that ˇ ω<ω≤ ˆ ω, one has determinacy but the determinate MSV solution is
E-unstable. Values of ω>ˆ ω lead to indeterminacy.13 For h =2 , we ﬁnd
that ˇ ω =ˆ ω so that only one number is reported for the h =2column.
Table 1. Regions of Determinacy and E-stability for diﬀerent
horizons
h 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
W 3.39 (.84,.84) (.3,.34) (.14,.17) (.07,.1) (.04,.06) (.03,.03)
CGG 1.87 (.44,.46) (.14,.18) (.06,.09) (.03,.04) (.01,.02) (.01,.01)
MN 10.39 (2.4,2.4) (.94,.94) (.45,.47) (.25,.28) (.15,.18) (.10,.12)
The determinate solution usually turns out to be E-stable (there are only
some exceptions). However, the range for which determinacy and E-stability
hold shrinks quite rapidly as the horizon increases. When h =8 , only very
small values of ω yield determinacy and E-stability.
Note that, in the interest rule (20), the responses to xt, πt, and it−1 are,
respectively, ωψx, ωψπ,a n d1+ωψi and these resemble the form of a Taylor
type rule with interest rate smoothing. With this rule, the Taylor principle
(TP) corresponds to the requirement
TP ≡ 1+ωψi + ωψπ + λ
−1(1 − β)ωψx > 1; (29)
see Chapter 4 of (Woodford 2003) for a discussion of the Taylor principle. It
can be veriﬁed analytically that for all horizons h =2 ,3,..,8,T P=1+ω
13We have not conducted an analysis of E-stability in the indeterminate region. We did
ag r i ds e a r c ho f0.01 for ω up to an upper bound for ω of 100.
14so that the rule does indeed satisfy the Taylor principle for all ω>0. In
fact, Proposition 4.4, p. 255, of (Woodford 2003), shows that the necessary
and suﬃcient condition for determinacy, for a rule of the form (20), in the
model (5) is that the Taylor principle be satisﬁed, i.e. that TP >1 provided
ψx > 0,ψ π > 0, and 1+ωψi > 0. The latter means that the individual
responses to xt,π t, and it−1 are all positive (as is perhaps true in realistic
versions of the Taylor type rule). However, for the rule (20), ψx < 0 for all
calibrations even though ψπ > 0, and 1+ωψi > 0.
We conjecture that the key to the failure of determinacy and E-stability
is the fact that the rule (20) fails to be super-inertial since 1+ωψi < 1.
With strict inﬂation targeting, it can be veriﬁed analytically that ψi < 0 for
all horizons h so that the rule is merely inertial. An explanation for this
conjecture will be provided later.
For CIRS rule II we have both indeterminacy and E-instability (the proof
is in Appendix B):
Proposition 4 CIRS-rule II associated with (19), i.e. equation (24), leads
to both indeterminacy and instability under adaptive learning of the MSV
solution for all horizons h.
4E x t e n s i o n s
4.1 Flexible Inﬂation Targeting
4.1.1 CIRUK Rules
We examine some extensions to our basic model. The analysis of Section 2 has
assumed that the central bank pursues a policy of strict inﬂation targeting,
which serves as a useful benchmark. We now turn to the arguably more
realistic case where the bank also has concerns for output in its loss function.
With ﬂexible inﬂation targeting and assuming that the target levels for
output gap and inﬂation are ¯ x and ¯ π, the central bank’s optimality condition
(under discretion) can be shown to be αxt+λπt−(λ¯ π+α¯ x)=0 , see (Evans
and Honkapohja 2003b) for the details. Thus, the bank seeks to achieve
αλ
−1Etxt+h + Etπt+h − (¯ π + αλ
−1¯ x)=0 . (30)
We again rewrite this constraint as
¯ π + αλ
−1¯ x = K(Etwt+h,E tyt+h)
 , K =( 0 ,0,αλ
−1,1). (31)
15Except for the change in K, the rest of the analysis formally proceeds as
before. The form of CIRUK rule I continues to be given by (13) with K as
deﬁned in (31). As before, we assume ¯ x =¯ π =0(w.l.o.g.).
Obviously, some assumptions about α must be made. In the numerical
analysis we assumed that α ranges from 0.1 (low concern for output) to 0.9
(high concern for output) at intervals of 0.1. We continue to have:14
Result: Under CIRUK rule I the REE is indeterminate and the MSV solu-
tion is E-unstable.
This result was obtained for the all examined α and across all three calibra-
tions. As for CIRUK rule II, Proposition 1 continues to be applicable for
the case of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting since the rule still depends only on the
exogenous shocks.
4.1.2 CIRS Rules
Since the bank’s targeting rule is now given by (31), a rule analogous to (17)
in this case can be written as
it − it−1 = ω[αλ
−1Etxt+h(it−1)+Etπt+h(it−1) − (¯ π + αλ
−1¯ x)] (32)
If the bank expects the expression within parentheses in (32) to be positive,
then interest rates should be raised to reduce inﬂationary pressures in the
economy. According to (32) the nominal interest rate is raised if the optimal
combination of forecasted output gap and inﬂation exceeds the corresponding
combination evaluated at the target values.15
For the formal analysis we remark, αλ
−1Etxt+h(it−1)+Etπt+h(it−1) will
be of the same form as the right hand side of (18) except for the change in
K, namely K =( 0 ,0,αλ
−1,1). Again, we simplify by assuming ¯ x =¯ π =0
and continue to obtain from (32), an interest rule of the form (20) but with
diﬀerent coeﬃcients. For example, with h =2 , the coeﬃcients are
ψx = λ
−1β
−2[α{β
2 +( 1+2 β)λϕ + λ
2ϕ
2}−λ
2(1 + β + λϕ)],
ψπ = λ
−1β
−2[λ(1 + λϕ) − αϕ(1 + β + λϕ)],
ψi = ϕλ
−1β
−1[α(2β + λϕ) − λ
−2].
14We report the main numerical ﬁndings as “Results” and not as Propositions.
15Responding to deviations from the optimality condition is similar in spirit to the
approximate targeting rule proposed by (McCallum and Nelson 2000). However, in the
McCallum-Nelson rule a deviation from optimality leads to an increase in the real interest
rate.
16Note that for large enough α, ψi > 0( and ψx > 0,ψ π < 0). One can verify
analytically for higher horizons that the same features are true and, conse-
quently, the interest rules are super-inertial for α large enough.
It can also be veriﬁed analytically that for all horizons h =2 ,3,..,8 the
interest rule (20), continues to satisfy the Taylor principle since
TP =1+ω + λ
−2αω(1 − β) > 1
for all α, ω > 0.
Since only K changes, the rest of the formal analysis proceeds as in Sec-
tion 2.3. We examine determinacy and E-stability for CIRS rule I for values
of 0 <ω≤ 15 and for values of α between 0.1 and 0.9, both at intervals of
0.1. Remarkably, numerical results suggest the following general conclusion:
Result: Most values of α lead to determinacy and E-stability of the deter-
minate solution for horizons h =2 ,3,..,8.
The conclusion shows that if the bank has suﬃcient concerns for output in its
loss function and adopts a rule of the form (32), CIRS rule I policy performs
well in terms of determinacy and E-stability.
The detailed ﬁndings are as follows. For the W calibration, we ﬁnd that
for all h, all values of α,ω examined lead to determinate REE which are also
E-stable. The corresponding rule (20) has its coeﬃcients satisfying ψx > 0,
ψπ < 0, and 1+ωψi > 1. So even though the response to πt is of the ”wrong”
sign, the rule is nevertheless super-inertial.
For the MN and CGG calibrations, the general theme is unchanged. With
either calibration, we ﬁnd that values of α ≥ 0.3 lead to determinacy and E-
stability for all h (with the CGG calibration only α ≥ 0.2 suﬃces). In other
words, a suﬃcient concern for output eliminates problems of determinacy
and E-stability. In addition, the associated rules tend to be super-inertial
since 1+ωψi > 1, i.e., ψi > 0 (they also satisfy ψx > 0 and ψπ < 0).
Determinacy sometimes fails for small values of α like α = .1,.2 when
the horizon h is large (say, h ≥ 4). These failures of determinacy typically
coincide with interest rules which satisfy 1+ωψi < 1 (along with ψx < 0,
ψπ > 0), i.e. when policy rules that are not super-inertial.16
We note that the MSV solution has bx < 0,b π < 0, and 0 <b i < 1
for all calibrations. These results together with those of the previous section
16With the CGG calibration, when h =4 ,α= .1, and ω ≥ 4.8, we found REE that are
determinate but E-unstable even when the rule is super-inertial (with ψx < 0,ψ π > 0).
17suggest that an important reason for determinacy and E-stability is the super-
inertial nature of the associated interest rule, which seems to be true even
when ψπ < 0, or ψx < 0.17 (Bullard and Mitra 2001) examined super-
inertial interest rules (with ψπ > 0,ψ x > 0 and dependence on lagged data)
and found these to be conducive to E-stability of the MSV solution for the
basic model (5). They also found that superinertial rules that depend on
contemporaneous data on inﬂation and output and the lagged interest rate,
as in rule (20), were conducive to determinacy and E-stability.
Finally, we remark that Proposition 4 continues to be applicable for CIRS
rule II since it was applicable for any determinate MSV solution under all
parameter values.
4.2 Inﬂation and Output Inertia
The model given by (2) and (3) is entirely forward-looking and as a result has
diﬃculty capturing the inertia in output and inﬂation evident in the data;
see (Fuhrer and Moore 1995b), (Fuhrer and Moore 1995a) and (Rudebusch
and Svensson 1999) for empirical results. We now look at an extension of
this model considered in (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999), Section 6, with
important backward-looking elements. This model consists of the structural
equations
xt = −ϕ

it − ˆ Etπt+1

+ θ ˆ Etxt+1 +( 1− θ)xt−1 + gt (33)
πt = λxt + βγ ˆ Etπt+1 +( 1− γ)πt−1 + ut (34)
The parameters θ and γ capture the inertia in output and inﬂation inherent
in the model and are assumed to be between 0 and 1. The shocks gt and ut
continue to follow the process (4).
We outline the formal analytical procedures in Appendix C.
17For some (intermediate) values of α, the individual responses in the interest rule to
output, inﬂation and lagged interest rates are all positive (as with the MN calibration)
and since the rule also always satisﬁes the Taylor principle, the determinacy result in
Proposition 4.4 of (Woodford 2003) is applicable.
184.2.1 CIRUK Rules
The CIRUK rule I, equation (43), under strict inﬂation targeting has the
general form
it = ϑggt + ϑuut + ϑxLxt−1 + ϑπLπt−1 + ϑxxt + ϑππt (35)
and it is possible to compute this rule explicitly for diﬀerent values of h.F o r
instance, with h =2 , the rule is
ϑg = ϕ
−1,ϑ u = −
θ + βγθµ+ λϕ
βγλϕ
,ϑ xL =
1 − θ
ϕ
,ϑ πL = −
(1 − γ)(θ + λϕ)
βγλϕ
,
ϑx = −
θ + βγ + λϕ
βγϕ
,ϑ π =
θ{1 − βγ(1 − γ)} + λϕ
βγλϕ
. (36)
Note that the response of the interest rule to the contemporaneous output
gap is negative (as in the non-inertial model) and, in addition, the response
to lagged inﬂation is now negative. Similar qualitative responses follow for
other horizons.
We examine determinacy and E-stability in the model with inertia (33),
(34) for the CIRUK rule I (35) when the central bank pursues strict inﬂation
targeting. When h =2 , we are able to obtain analytical results and we
analyze this case ﬁrst.18 When h =2 , there is indeterminacy for all values of
output and inﬂation inertia. The MSV solution turns out to be unique but
it is not E-stable:
Proposition 5 CIRUK rule I leads to indeterminacy in the model (40) when
h =2 . There exists a unique MSV solution, which is E-unstable.
T h er e s u l ti sp r o v e di nA p p e n d i xC . F o rh>2, we need to resort to
numerical analysis and we let γ and θ take values from 0.1 to 0.9 at in-
tervals of 0.1. Table 2 below reports the results when h =4 . In this table,
the third column shows determinacy (D) or indeterminacy (I). The fourth
column shows the number of stationary MSV solutions. Obviously, in the
determinate case, there is only one stationary solution whereas there may
18For E-stability, we continue to assume that agents’s expectations are based on in-
formation of endogenous variables at time t − 1, which we believe is more realistic since
contemporaneous data on output and inﬂation are not usually available for making fore-
casts.
19be more than one in the indeterminate region. The ﬁnal column examines
E-stability of the stationary MSV solutions whether in the determinate or
indeterminate region.
Table 2. CIRUK Rule I: E-stability of MSV solution when h=4
γ θ Det/Indet #o fs t a ts o l n s E-stability
.1 {.1,..,.5} D 1 No
.1 {.6,..,.9} I 2 No in both cases
.2 .1 D 1 Yes
.2 {.2,..,.5} D 1 No
.2 {.6,..,.9} I 2 No in both cases
.3 .1 D 1 Yes
.3 .2,.3,.4 D 1 No
.3 {.5,..,.9} I 2 No in both cases
.4 .1 D 1 Yes
.4 .2,.3 D 1 No
.4 {.4,..,.9} I 2 No in both cases
.5 .1 D 1 Yes
.5 .2 D 1 No
.5 {.3,..,.9} I 2 No in both cases
{.6,.7} {.1,..,.9} I 2 No in both cases
.8 {.1,..,.6},.9 I 2 No in both cases
.8 .7,.8 I 3 No in all cases
.9 {.1,..,.5},.8 I 2 No in both cases
.9 .6,.7,.9 I 3 No in all cases
T h et a b l es h o w st h a tm o s tv a l u e so fi n ﬂ a t i o na n do u t p u ti n e r t i al e a dt o
indeterminacy when h =4 . Even if determinacy obtains, the (locally) unique
solution is usually E-unstable. In the indeterminate region, all MSV solutions
always turn out to be E-unstable.
Similar results follow for higher horizons. These results indicate that
policy using CIRUK rule I continues to have undesirable properties in the
presence of inertia.
For brevity, we do not report the performance of CIRUK rule II here.
We have checked numerically that the qualitative features of this rule are
basically unchanged from those of CIRUK rule I. Most parameter values
continue to lead to indeterminacy and all MSV solutions are E-unstable.
204.2.2 CIRS Rules
We consider the performance of CIRS rule I in the presence of ﬂexible in-
ﬂation targeting.19 For simplicity, we assume µ = ρ =¯ x =¯ π =0 .I n t h e
presence of inﬂation inertia, the targeting rule (31) takes the form
0=K(Etwt+h,E tyt+h)
 , K =( 0 ,0,α(1 − β˜ aπ)λ
−1,1), (37)
compare (6.4) in (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999). 0 ≤ ˜ aπ < 1 is the
solution of the lagged inﬂation term in equation (6.5) of (Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler 1999). When γ =1 , ˜ aπ =0 . We ﬁrst summarize the general nature
of the results in this case.
Results: The CIRS rule I continues to perform well in the presence of low
levels of output and inﬂation inertia. The presence of high levels of inertia
hampers the performance of this rule.
Consider ﬁrst determinacy under the rule. Table 3 depicts the region of
determinacy when h =8for the W and CGG calibrations. For each value
of γ in the ﬁrst row, the table reports the critical value ¯ θ such that one has
determinacy for all θ ≥ ¯ θ when α ≥ .8.20
Table 3. Region of Determinacy when h = 8
γ .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 ≥ .6
W .6 .6 .5 .4 .3 .1
CGG .6 .5 .4 .3 .2 .1
For the W and CGG calibrations, there typically exists no stationary REE
for values of θ<¯ θ. For the W calibration, one has determinacy (typically)
whenever α ≥ .1. However, for the CGG calibration, there are indeterminacy
problems even for moderate and relatively high values of α, especially when
inﬂation inertia is high. For example, when θ = .9, one has indeterminacy
for α between .1 and .7 when γ = .1, while the same problem persists for
values of α between .1 and .4 when γ = .2.
It seems, therefore, that determinacy can fail in the presence of high levels
of inertia in the model and, even if determinacy prevails, the determinate
19The case of strict inﬂation targeting gives the same results qualitatively as the case
when α is small.
20We examined determinacy for values of γ,θ,α between .1 and .9 and for values of ω
between .1 and 2, all at intervals of length .1.
21solution may be E-unstable. For simplicity, we considered E-stability of
CIRS rule I in the presence of inﬂation inertia only, i.e., the case θ =1 .
We observed that with low levels of inﬂation inertia (i.e., high γ values like
.8,.9), the determinate solution is typically E-stable whereas for larger levels
of inﬂation inertia, the determinate solution is typically E-unstable.
5 Concluding Remarks
The results in this paper suggest that the conduct of inﬂation targeting by us-
ing CIR policy is subject to two fundamental diﬃculties. First, there may be
multiple stationary RE solutions under such a policy. Second, the suggested
interest rates rules of this approach can lead to instability of equilibria under
learning. We remark that optimal inﬂation targeting policies, discussed e.g.
in (Svensson 2003a), are an alternative to CIR policies and there seem to be
ways to implement them to achieve determinacy and learnability; see (Evans
and Honkapohja 2003a).
We have examined two versions of CIR inﬂation targeting, which we called
CIRUK and CIRS. It was found that CIRUK policies are particularly vulner-
able to the twin problems of indeterminacy and E-instability in all versions
of the models examined. CIRS rule I, on the other hand, has more appeal-
ing features in terms of determinacy and E-stability in the forward-looking
model, especially when ﬂexible inﬂation targeting is employed. However, its
performance can be problematic in the presence of high inﬂation or output
inertia. One reason for the poor performance may be the relative simplicity
of the rule itself. In inertial models one may have to look at other rules
to deliver a robust performance. We leave a detailed investigation of these
issues to the future.
The basic analysis can be extended in various ways. First, we made the
strong assumption that the central bank knows the structural parameters
of the economy when it computes the CIR interest rate rule. If structural
parameters are not known, they can be estimated from data as in (Evans
and Honkapohja 2003b) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a). A result of
(Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) shows that an interest rate rule that leads
to instability under learning when the policy-maker knows the structural
parameters does not fare better when structural parameters are estimated.
We conjecture that an analogous result will hold for CIR interest rate rules.
Second, we have limited attention to the computation of CIR policy sug-
22gested by (Leitemo 2003). While Leitemo’s approach is very natural, the
appendix of (Svensson 1998), which is the unpublished version of (Svensson
1999), suggests a diﬀerent formulation of what is meant by inﬂation targeting
with a ﬁxed target at ﬁxed horizon. Svensson’s approach is quite general as
he constructs consistent internal forecasts relative to any ﬁxed interest rate
rule beyond a speciﬁed horizon. However, formulations of Svensson’s ap-
proach in the basic forward-looking model make the interest rate dependent
only on exogenous shocks, and a result analogous to Proposition 1 is then
applicable. Moreover, as pointed out by (Leitemo 2003), further consistency
restrictions naturally arise. For example, Leitemo’s rules of the form (13)
and (16) do not meet consistency beyond and within the targeting horizon.
Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2 we ﬁrst note that it is unnecessary to consider the
exogenous shocks for these results. They play no role in indeterminacy and
also, in this setting, the E-instability part follows from considering the model
without the shocks. We ﬁrst consider determinacy for 4 ≥ h ≥ 2 and E-
stability for 4 ≥ h>2. The ﬁnal part of the proof concerns E-stability when
h =2as this case raises special issues.
Substituting (14) into (5) and omitting the shocks, we have the system
Myt = NE
∗
tyt+1,w h e r e
M =
 
1+ϕχx ϕχπ
−λ 1
 
,N =
 
1 ϕ
0 β
 
.
Since both variables are free, we need both eigenvalues of M−1N to be in-
side the unit circle for determinacy whereas for E-stability we need the real
parts of the eigenvalues of M−1N to be less than 1. Alternatively, condi-
tions for determinacy and E-stability may be given in terms of the trace and
determinant of M−1N as the system is two-dimensional.
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy turns out to be
0 >A b s [Det(M
−1N)] − 1
0 >A b s [Tr(M
−1N)] − 1 − Det(M
−1N),
23where Abs refers to the absolute value of the bracketed expression. The
necessary and suﬃcient condition for E-stability turns out to be
Tr(M
−1N − I) < 0,
Det(M
−1N − I) > 0.
We now examine determinacy and E-stability for various horizons h using
the above conditions. In the case h =2matrix M is singular, but we can
assess determinacy by computing
N
−1M =
 
−β
−1 (βλ)−1
−λβ
−1 β
−1
 
.
Both eigenvalues of N−1M are zero, so that we have indeterminacy. The
analysis of E-stability for h =2is given later since the singularity of M
raises additional technical and conceptual issues.
In the case h =3we get
M
−1N =
 
1+2β+λϕ
β
−1+(β−1)λϕ
βλ
λ(1+2β+λϕ)
β
(β−1)(1+β+λϕ)
β
 
.
It is easy to check that Det(M−1N)−1=2 β+λϕ > 0, so that indeterminacy
prevails. In addition, Tr(M−1N − I)=β + λϕ > 0 implying E-instability.
In the case h =4we have
Det(M
−1N) − 1=
3β
2 +3 βλϕ+ λϕ(1 + λϕ)
1+2 β + λϕ
> 0,
Tr(M
−1N − I)=
2β
2 +3 βλϕ+ λϕ(1 + λϕ)
1+2 β + λϕ
> 0
so that both indeterminacy and E-instability prevail.
Finally, we consider E-stability for h =2 . Substituting the interest rate
rule when h =2into (5) we can obtain the system
Qyt = AE
∗
tyt+1 + Pw t, (38)
Q =
 
−
1+λϕ
β
1+λϕ
βλ
−
λ(1+β+λϕ)
β
1+β+λϕ
β
 
,P =
 
0
1+βρ+λϕ
βλ
0
1+β+βρ+λϕ
β
 
and A is deﬁned in connection with (5). It can be computed that the eigen-
values of Q are 0 and 1.
24We ﬁrst consider whether there is a unique MSV REE to this system. Let
a perceived law of motion (PLM) be
yt = a + bwt
and compute forecasts
E
∗
tyt+1 = a + bV wt.
Substituting the PLM and the forecast into (38) yields the equations
Ma = Aa
Mb = AbV + P
to compute a and b. It is easily veriﬁed that these equations have a unique
solution.
Next, consider E-stability. The ﬁrst step is to consider the temporary
equilibrium for given forecasts, i.e. the equations
Myt = A(a + bV wt)+Pwt,
where yt = a∗ + b∗wt, are to be solved for the actual law of motion (ALM).
For a∗ and b∗ we have the equations
Ma
∗ = Aa,
(I ⊗ M)vecb
∗ =( V ⊗ A)vecb+ vecP,
where the equation for b∗ has been vectorized. (Here ⊗ is the Kronecker
product of two matrices.) The equation determining a∗ has either a unique
solution or a continuum of solutions since the rank of M is 1. Correspond-
ingly, the rank of I ⊗ M is 2. This means that there is either no ALM for a
given PLM or the ALM is not unique. The analysis of E-stability must thus
be restricted to those PLM that lead to a solution for a∗ and b∗.H o w e v e r ,i n
this case the non-uniqueness of the ALM present a further diﬃculty as the
E-stability diﬀerential equations are then not well-deﬁned.
We can analyze E-stability only in partial manner in which, for example,
only one component of a∗ and a take values other than the MSV REE values
while the other component is kept at the REE value.21 Likewise for vecb∗
21The analogous idea of separately considering convergence for diﬀerent parameters is
used in (Moore 1993).
25and vecb we can consider E-stability only in the limited sense that just two
components of these vectors are not at the REE values.
For a∗ and a we then have the E-stability diﬀerential equations
da1
dτ
= a
∗
1 − a1 =
A11
M11
a1 − a1,
da2
dτ
= a
∗
2 − a2 =
A22
M22
a2 − a2,
where we use the notation M =( Mij), A =( Aij) for the elements of the two
matrices. We have
A11
M11
= −
β
1+λϕ
< 0,
A22
M22
=
β(β + λϕ)
1+β + λϕ
< 1,
so that these two diﬀerential equations are locally stable.
For vecb∗ and vecb it is easily seen that the system is block diagonal since
I ⊗ M =
 
M 0
0 M
 
.
This form implies that we can have one component from each block to deviate
from the REE to deﬁne the E-stability equations. Moreover,
V ⊗ M =




µµ ϕ00
λµ µ(β + λϕ)0 0
00ρρ ϕ
00 λρ ρ(β + λϕ)



,
so that the E-stability diﬀerential equations for the ﬁrst block are
db11
dτ
=
 
−
µβ
1+λϕ
− 1
 
b11 + other,
db21
dτ
=
 
µβ(β + λϕ)
1+β + λϕ
− 1
 
b21 + other,
where “other” refers to constant terms that do not aﬀect stability. Both of
these diﬀerential equations are stable. Finally, for b21 and b22 we get the
same diﬀerential equations, except that ρ replaces µ in the matrices. This
completes the proof of E-stability.
26B Results for CIRS Rules
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :When h =2 , the characteristic polynomial of the
determinacy matrix B3 is
p(τ) ≡ τ
3 + C2τ
2 + C1τ + C0,
C2 = −β
−2[β
2 − ωλϕ(1 + λϕ)+β(1 + λϕ − 2 − ωλϕ)],
C1 = −β
−3[β
2(1 − ωλϕ)+βωλϕ{(ω − 2)λϕ − 2} + ωλ
2ϕ
2(ω − 1)(1 + λϕ)],
C0 = β
−3[ωλϕ{β − (ω − 1)λϕ}].
Then computing p(1) = 1 + C2 + C1 + C0 and p(−1) = −1+C2 − C1 + C0
one obtains
p(1) = λϕβ
−3(ω − 1)(β
2 + βωλϕ+ ωλ
2ϕ
2),
p(−1) = β
−3E
where E is as deﬁned in Proposition 3. Woodford has given necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for exactly one eigenvalue of B3 to be inside the unit
circle (which is the condition for determinacy) in terms of the characteristic
polynomial, see Proposition C.2, p. 672 of (Woodford 2003). If 0 <ω<
1, then p(1) < 0, so that we are in Woodford’s Case I (i.e., (A.1) holds).
Consequently, determinacy holds iﬀ p(−1) > 0 which is equivalent to E>0.
Note also that p(0) = C0 > 0 when 0 <ω<1 and since p(1) < 0 then, we
necessarily have one eigenvalue of B3 inside and one outside the unit circle
so that we always have either determinacy or indeterminacy depending on
the position of the third real eigenvalue (i.e., there always exists at least one
stationary REE).
Proof of Proposition 4: Using (24) in the basic model (5), we obtain
the following system, where ςt =( xt,π t,i t) ,
ςt = ˆ   ˆ Etςt+1 + ˆ δςt−1 +ˆ κwt, (39)
ˆ   =


1 ϕ 0
λβ + λϕ 0
000

,ˆ δ =


00 −ϕb 
i
00−λϕb 
i
00 b 
i

.
We note that the form of the MSV solution with CIRS rule II takes the
same form as (21)-(23), except that bx,b π,b i (and also other coeﬃcients) take
27diﬀerent values. For future reference, we denote these values respectively by
b 
x,b  
π,b  
i.
Deﬁning zt =( xt,π t,i t−1) , for determinacy we need to look at the system
B1Etzt+1 = ˆ B2zt; ˆ B2 =


10 ϕb 
i
01λϕb 
i
00 b 
i


and B1 deﬁned in (26). REE is determinate iﬀ the matrix
B
−1
1 ˆ B2 =


1+λϕβ
−1 −ϕβ
−1 ϕb 
i
−λβ
−1 β
−1 0
00 b 
i


has exactly one eigenvalue inside the unit circle. It can be veriﬁed that one
eigenvalue equals b 
i and the remaining two eigenvalues are given by those of
the characteristic polynomial
p(µ) ≡ µ
2 − µ(1 + β
−1 + λϕβ
−1)+β
−1.
It is easy to check that p(0) > 0 and p(1) < 0 so that one eigenvalue of p(µ)
is between 0 and 1 and the other one exceeds 1. Note that for a determinate
MSV solution, we must have |b 
i| < 1 so that exactly two eigenvalues of B
−1
1 ˆ B2
are inside the unit circle. The arguments show that REE is indeterminate
with CIRS rule II for all horizons and structural parameters.
We now turn to an analysis of E-stability of the system (39), which is
formally the same as in the previous section. One of the necessary conditions
for E-stability is that the matrix ˆ   + ˆ  ¯ b, where
ˆ   + ˆ  ¯ b =


1 ϕb  
x + ϕb 
π
λβ + λϕ λb 
x +( β + λϕ)b 
π
00 0

,
has eigenvalues with real parts less than one. It is easy to see that one
eigenvalue of ˆ  + ˆ  ¯ b is zero and the remaining two are given by those of the
matrix A in (6). A has an eigenvalue more than 1 so that all MSV solutions
of the model (39) are necessarily E-unstable. This result is again independent
of the horizon used by the bank and structural parameters.
28C Details for the Inertial Model
As in Section 2.2, we can write the model with inertia in matrix form as
yt = A1E
∗
tyt+1 + L1yt−1 + Bwt + Dit, (40)
wt = Vw t−1 + vt,
where yt =( xt,π t) , wt =( gt,u t) , vt =( ˜ gt, ˜ ut)  and the matrices are
A1 =
 
θϕ
λθ βγ + λϕ
 
,L 1 =
 
1 − θ 0
λ(1 − θ)1 − γ
 
. (41)
with B and D as deﬁned before in (6). Strict inﬂation targeting is deﬁned
as before by equations (1) and (7) leading to a form corresponding to (8):
 
y1,t+1
Ety2,t+1
 
=Ω 1
 
y1,t
y2,t
 
+Ψ 1it +
 
vt
0
 
, (42)
where y2,t =( xt,π t) , y1,t =( gt,u t,x lt,π lt) , vt =( ˜ gt, ˜ ut) , and xlt ≡ xt−1,πlt ≡
πt−1. Also
Ω1 =


 


 

µ 00 0 0 0
0 ρ 00 0 0
00 0 0 1 0
00 0 0 0 1
−1
θ
ϕ
θγβ −1−θ
θ
ϕ(1−γ)
θγβ
1+ϕλγ−1β−1
θ −
ϕ
θγβ
0 − 1
γβ 0 −
(1−γ)
γβ − λ
γβ
1
γβ


 


 

,Ψ1 =

 





0
0
0
0
ϕ
θ
0

 





.
It is possible to compute the interest rule based on constant interest rate
projections in the same way as before. The CIRUK rule I corresponding to
(13) is now
it = −
 
K
h−1  
j=0
Ω
j
1Ψ1
 −1
KΩ
h
1
 
y1,t
y2,t
 
, (43)
with K =( 0 ,0,0,0,0,1).
Proof of Proposition 5: The matrix for checking determinacy, namely,

 

− 1
βγ
1+βγ(γ−1)
βγλ 0
γ−1
βγλ
− λ
βγ
1
βγ 0
γ−1
βγ
10 0 0
01 0 0

 

29has all eigenvalues equal to zero. However, since there are two free and two
pre-determined variables, determinacy requires exactly two eigenvalues inside
the unit circle. We now show that even though indeterminacy prevails, there
exists a unique MSV solution when h =2 .
Plugging the interest rule, (35), with the coeﬃcients (36), into the system
(40), we get the reduced form system
yt = AfE
∗
tyt+1 + Alyt−1 + Awwt, (44)
Af =
 
−(1 − γ)−1 1−βγ(1−γ)
λ(1−γ)
−λ(1 − γ)−1 (1 − γ)−1
 
,A l =
 
0 −λ
−1(1 − γ)
00
 
Aw =
 
0[ λ(γ − 1)]−1(1 − γ + ρ)
0 −ρ(1 − γ)−1
 
.
Note that the lagged output gap and the gt shock do not appear in the
reduced form system (44); the interest rule has oﬀset both these terms. The
MSV solution of (44), consequently, takes the form
xt = ax + bxπt−1 + cxut, (45)
πt = aπ + bππt−1 + cπut. (46)
It is easy to verify that there exists a unique MSV solution of this form and
it involves ax = aπ =0 , and
bx = −λ
−1(1 − γ),b π =0 . (47)
We now check E-stability of this unique MSV solution. Assuming agents
have a PLM of the form (45)-(46), they compute their forecasts E∗
txt+1 and
E∗
tπt+1 and these forecasts used in (44) lead to an ALM of the same form. If
agents use t − 1 data to compute their forecasts, the E-stability conditions
for such a system are given by Proposition 10.1 in (Evans and Honkapohja
2001). For the constant term, the eigenvalues corresponding to the following
characteristic polynomial p(τ) need to have negative real parts for E-stability.
p(τ)=τ
2 + τ +
βγ
γ − 1
However, p(0) < 0,p (∞) > 0 which implies that there exists a positive
eigenvalue.
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